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Abstract Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are usually classified according to
their form into four broad categories: preferential arrangements, free trade agree-
ments, customs unions and common markets. This paper investigates whether the
form/depth of RTAs matters concerning their effect on trade. I use a proper spec-
ification of the gravity model with panel data on the 1960–2000 period, which
specifically control for self-selection into agreements. Results show that creating
any kind of RTAs providing trade preferences to their member countries signifi-
cantly increases bilateral trade. Nevertheless, their average treatment effect on
bilateral trade does not significantly differ according to the depth of agreements.
Keywords Trade  Regionalism
JEL Classification F10  F15
1 Introduction
At the end of 2005, 158 regional trade agreements (RTAs) were in force worldwide,
which makes preferential trade liberalization a prominent feature of the interna-
tional trading system today. The scope and coverage of these agreements
nevertheless greatly differ from one to the other, in terms of trade flows,
membership as well as population involved.
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The canonical taxonomy of RTAs, initially introduced by Balassa (1961),
considers regionalism as a gradual process towards economic union, through free
trade area, customs union (CU) and common market (CM). The implicit assumption
behind is that more integrated arrangements provide for deeper trade integration,
because each additional step of regional integration would reduce further intra-
regional trade costs.1 However, from a theoretical point of view, the ‘‘form/depth’’
of regional integration is not systematically related to the level of trade costs. If
preferential arrangements (PAs) can be considered as free trade areas whose scope
and coverage are less complete, a CU or a CM cannot be simply understood as
further steps of economic integration. Devices of integration solely differ according
to the form of trade integration: while entering a CU involves to give up sovereignty
on trade policy to implement a common external tariff, free trade agreements
(FTAs) allow member countries to keep the ability to set their tariffs vis-a`-vis other
partners, thanks to the use of rules of origin. Both nevertheless allow for broad
preferential regimes, using different instruments of trade policy.2 The degree of
trade integration is thus likely to vary according to RTAs, but not necessarily in
relation with their form or the depth of political integration they entail. This paper
investigates empirically whether the form/depth of RTAs determines the extent of
trade creation among members.
Empirical evidence of any larger effect of deeper RTAs on the volume of
regional trade is missing. Few papers even distinguish between different categories
of RTAs. Two exceptions are Ghosh and Yamarik (2004b) and Kandogan (2008),
who find puzzling results concerning the effect of economic integration on intra-
regional trade: coefficients on CU and CM membership dummies are found to be
negative and significant in several specifications. However, it is worth noting that
they do not control for multilateral resistance terms and, more importantly, for self-
selection into RTAs. Indeed, papers on the determinants of RTAs suggest a ‘‘market
for regionalism’’ view of regional trade integration, where countries choose their
partners (Baier and Bergstrand 2004b) and the form of the RTA (Vicard 2008)
according to economic and political determinants. Ex post estimations of the effect
of RTAs on trade are thus likely to suffer from a selection bias, because pairs of
countries which have more to gain from regional integration (or more to loose from
no-agreement) are more likely to create a RTA and to choose the appropriate form
of regional integration.
In this paper, I estimate a theoretically motivated gravity equation, in which the
definition of RTAs is refined by introducing a distinction between different
categories of RTAs according to their form/depth. Self-selection is specifically
accounted for by using panel data with country-pair and country-and-time fixed
effects or differenced panel with country-and-time fixed effects. Three important
conclusions emerge from empirical results. First, unobservable heterogeneity
affects differently the estimates of the treatment effect of different kinds of RTAs,
1 For instance, Krueger (1997) argues that a free trade area cannot be more trade creating than a customs
union because the former entails the implementation of rules of origin.
2 For instance, the arrangements governing foreign investments under the NAFTA allow for a great
mobility of capital.
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i.e. different country pairs choose to create different kinds of RTAs. Second, the
analysis conducted in this paper confirms that all RTAs providing trade preferences
to their members have a significant positive effect on bilateral trade. Third,
this average treatment effect does nevertheless not differ statistically according
to the depth/form of integration. Once self-selection into agreements is controlled
for, creating a free trade area, a CU or a CM has the same effect on intra-regional
trade.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the extent of preferential trade
in the world. Section 3 specifies a theoretically grounded gravity equation with
panel data. Results are presented in Sect. 4 and some robustness analysis in Sect. 5.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Regional trade agreements in the world
Since World War II, the coverage and scope of regional trade integration have
greatly expanded, from Benelux—the first RTA created in 1947 as a CU between
three countries, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands—to the 158 RTAs in
force at the end of 2005, of which 125 were bilateral agreements3. These agreements
range from the simple exchange of trade preferences on a limited range of products
to the harmonization of policies well beyond tariffs, such as competition policies,
infrastructure or standards. The creation of RTAs and their form are constrained by
international rules agreed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and now under the WTO. On the one hand, RTAs are a deviation from the
principle of equal treatment defined by the ‘‘most-favored-nation’’ clause. Two
articles frame their creation. GATT’s article XXIV allows the creation of FTAs or
CUs which removes tariff barriers on substantially all trade in goods. On the other
hand, the so-called ‘‘enabling clause’’ permits PAs among developing countries,
which are partial scope agreements on trade in goods. WTO rules specifically forbid
the creation of PAs including developed countries.
Out of the 158 RTAs in force at the end of 2005, 2 were CMs, 11 CUs, 122 FTAs
and 23 PAs. However, in terms of the number of country pairs covered, FTAs are
not overwhelming since they are mostly bilateral agreements. Figure 1 depicts the
evolution of country-pair membership to RTAs according to their form over the
period from 1948 to 2005. It shows that pairs of countries which are members of a
RTA represent about 14% of country pairs worldwide in 2005, from only 1% in
1948 and around 4% in the 1980s. Trade flows between RTA partners nevertheless
represent one third of world trade today (World Bank 2005), which underlines that
trade agreements are signed between countries trading intensively with each others.
Preferential arrangements prevail thanks in particular to the Protocol Relating to
Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries signed in 1973 by 16 countries
3 The focus of this paper is on reciprocal agreements on trade in goods, so these figures do not include
non-reciprocal arrangements like Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), as well as service agreements
notified under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) article V.
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and the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries signed in
1989 by 44 countries. CU was the second more prominent form of RTAs until the
1990s, when the number and coverage of FTAs exploded, in particular with bilateral
agreements signed by the European Union (EU) with Central and Eastern European
countries. These agreements were nevertheless cancelled in 2004 by the accession
of the ten new members to the EU, slowing down the growth path of FTA coverage
in the 2000s. FTAs cover almost 4% of country pairs at end of 2005. CMs cover
only two pairs of countries (under Benelux), from 1961 to the creation of the EU in
1992. This form of RTA then expands rapidly with the enlargement of the EU and
ranks third in term of global country-pair coverage. The overwhelming prevalence
of FTA in absolute number is dramatically reduced in terms of country-pair
coverage, since CMs cover almost half of the number of country pairs under a
FTA.4
A quick look at the data seems to rule out the idea of a graduate process of
regional integration suggested by the traditional classification of RTAs presented
above. Deeply integrated RTAs seem to be created directly as such. Indeed, out of
the 18 CUs created worldwide since 1948, 14 have been created directly as such,
without any intermediate step like a PA or a FTA. Out of the four remaining, two
actually experienced a gradual integration, implying the creation of a PA or a FTA
prior to CU, but on a short period of time [7 years for the Andean Customs Union
and 5 years concerning the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)]. Besides, the West
Fig. 1 Membership in RTAs (% of the total number of country pairs in the world)
4 Fiorentino et al. (2007) moreover underline that planed RTAs are mostly bilateral FTAs.
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African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Golf Cooperation
Council (GCC) have been preceded during a significant period of time by a PA
before adopting common external tariffs in 1998 and 2003, respectively. Two of
these CUs turned into a CM (Benelux and the EU). Another exception is the
complex network of bilateral FTAs created prior to accession to the EU. All
remaining FTAs and PAs did not evolve into any ‘‘deeper’’ form of RTA.
3 A proper specification of the gravity equation
The impact of RTAs on trade is mostly measured ex post using a gravity equation
(Frankel 1997; Carre`re 2006). This model relates bilateral trade flows to the
economic size of partner countries and their distance. Additional variables are
generally added to this basic specification to control for different kinds of barriers to
trade. More recently, papers providing formal economic foundations for the initially
atheoretical gravity equation underlined the need to account for price levels to avoid
any estimation bias due to the omission of exporting and importing countries’
multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, 2004; Feenstra
2004). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive these importer’s and exporter’s
resistance terms from a full expenditure system on a cross-section of data, and show
that including country-specific fixed effects yields the same results. Baldwin and
Taglioni (2006) show that, because multilateral resistance terms are likely to be time
varying, such methodology do not simply translate in a panel setting. A proper
specification of the gravity equation with panel data requires to include country-and-
time fixed effects, which account for multilateral resistance terms varying over time.
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest two econometric specifications of the gravity
equation to properly estimate the average treatment effect of RTAs: panel data with
bilateral and country-and-time fixed effects or differenced panel data with country-
and-time effects. Including bilateral fixed effects or first-differencing data removes
the bias arising from the omission of unobserved variables affecting both the
explained (bilateral trade) and explaining variables (RTA membership dummies)
and allows to take into account the endogeneity related to self-selection, since it is
mainly a cross-sectional issue.5 Indeed, Baier and Bergstrand (2004b) investigate
the economic determinants of RTAs and find significant cross-section evidence that
countries choose well their RTA partners, i.e. pairs of countries signing RTAs tend
to share economic characteristics likely to enhance benefits from regional trade
integration. They nevertheless identify only a subset of economic determinants of
RTAs, which leaves a large unobserved heterogeneity. Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
argue that the heterogeneity in determinants of trade, unobserved in estimations of
gravity equations, is negatively associated to the decision to form a RTA. Not
accounting for this heterogeneity would thus bias estimated coefficients on RTAs.
On the one hand, suppose that two countries lack bilateral transport infrastructures
5 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) review alternative methods to deal with this endogeneity bias. In
particular, instrumental-variable estimation and Heckman’s control function approach fail to solve the
endogeneity issue.
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or exhibit extensive domestic regulations reducing bilateral trade, and that these
characteristics are unobservable to the econometrician—this creates a negative error
term in the gravity equation. Expected gains from regional integration would be
larger for these countries, and their government would be more likely to select into
RTA, if creating a RTA not only reduces tariff barriers but also generates spillovers
on regional infrastructures or leads to the harmonization of domestic regulations and
standards. On the other hand, when unobserved cultural or historical characteristics
shared by two countries increase at the same time trade flows and the likelihood of
forming a RTA, by reducing costs related to regional integration for instance, then
estimated coefficients would be biased upward. Anyway, the discussion above
suggests that the decision to enter a RTA is mainly cross-sectional in nature, since it
is related to the actual level of trade relative to its potential level. Recent changes in
the level of trade are indeed not likely to lead to the creation of RTAs, but countries’
structural characteristics are.
Yet, different kinds of RTAs are likely to be related differently to unobserved
trade impediments or facilitation. As underlined by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004), in a politically fragmented world such as the international system today,
international transaction costs have more to do with domestic policies (regulation,
norms, property rights, infrastructures…) than traditional tariff barriers. The
harmonization of these policies can be dealt with from several perspectives, using
different instruments and producing different institutional frameworks. On the one
hand, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and Blomberg and Hess (2006) respectively
show that insecurity and violence are strong deterrent of trade. On the other hand,
Vicard (2008) underlines that the determinants of RTAs differ according to the
form/depth of integration. In particular, in a system where no supranational
institution or third party can enforce property rights at the international level,
country pairs experiencing interstate conflicts need mechanisms securing the
continuity of trade flows in the future. Hence, CUs or CMs, which imply the
creation of a strong regional institutional framework, are created between countries
experiencing lots of interstates disputes, whereas international insecurity deters the
formation of PAs and FTAs. Consequently, omitted security variables are likely to
bias the coefficients on RTAs depending on their depth. When creating an RTA,
country pairs thus choose the suitable form according to their economic, political or
cultural characteristics. Accordingly, the omitted variable bias would differ between
categories of RTAs.
In a cross-section of data, the only way to address such endogeneity is through
the use of instrumental variables. However, no exogenous instruments are available
(Magee 2003; Baier and Bergstrand 2004a). On the contrary, using panel data this
endogeneity issue can be dealt with using country-pair fixed effects or by first-
differencing the data. Because choosing between these two methods is difficult,
Wooldridge (2003) recommends to report results using both. In the case of a large
number of periods, the latter is likely to be more efficient when error terms exhibit
substantial positive serial correlation. Unobserved factors influencing both our
explaining and explained variables are likely to be changing slowly, i.e. to be
serially correlated. As a robustness check, both methods are reported below, but our
preferred is first-differencing the panel data.
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Formally, the following theoretically motivated specification of the gravity
equation is estimated:
ln Tijt ¼ b0 þ b1 ln ðGDPitGDPjtÞ þ b2 ln DISTij þ b3 Controlij þ b4 PoAijt
þb5 PAijt þ b5 FTAijt þ b7 CUijt þ b8 CMijt  ln Pit  ln Pjt þ tijt
ð1Þ
Controls added are common to the gravity literature, i.e. bilateral distance and
dummies for common border, language and colonizer, countries ever in a colonial
relationship, and landlocked countries. All these time-invariant bilateral determi-
nants of trade are dropped when bilateral fixed effects are introduced or data are
first-differenced. In the same manner, GDPs as well as multilateral resistance terms
(Pit and Pjt) are explained by country-and-time fixed effects.
The dependent variable Tijt is the average of the log of two-way imports. Trade
data originate from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Direction of Trade
Statistics (DoTS) database, and are assembled by Martin et al. (2008). Data on GDP
are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, and
geographic and historical data come from CEPII.6 Annual observations every five
years over the period 1960–2000 are used, which leaves us with a sample of
potentially 188 countries over nine periods, with gaps.
The average treatment effect of each kind of RTA on intra-regional trade is
estimated separately, through the inclusion of four different categories of RTAs,
according to their actual form (PA, FTA, CU and CM), to which Political
Agreements (PoAs) are added.7 All bilateral or RTAs in force at least 1 year
between 1960 and 2000 are considered.8 Unless otherwise mentioned in the sources,
an agreement is assumed to be in force at the date defined in the treaty and, if not
available, once the agreement has been signed and ratified. It nevertheless does not
mean that all provisions of the agreement have been fully implemented at this date,
since a phase-in period is often planned in the treaties. Each dummy variable is set
at 1 when both countries of the pair are members of the same agreement during the
year considered, i.e. at each of the nine years considered in our data set. The details
of the official dates of RTAs and the dates actually used in our data set with 5-year
intervals are provided in the Appendix. A pair of countries can thereby be member
of only one kind of agreement a given year. The data set reports 146 RTAs over the
period 1960–2000, of which 24 are coded as PAs, 103 FTAs, 17 CUs and 2 CMs,
and 7 PoAs (a complete list is provided in the Appendix).
As argued above, I control for self-selection into RTAs either through first-
differencing the data or including country-pair fixed effects. It means that only the
time variation in RTA membership over the period covered by our data is accounted
6 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
7 A political agreement is defined as an organization aiming at liberalizing trade among its members but
falling short of providing for tariff preferences inherent in a CM, CU, FTA or PA, such as the Generalized
System of Preferences or the Everything but Arms regulation adopted by the European Union, which
provide preferential or even duty free access to least developed or developing countries on a non
reciprocal basis, are not considered in this paper.
8 Data are assembled from notifications to the WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/
region_e.htm), Foroutan (1993, 1998), Langhammer and Hiemenz (1990), Frankel (1997), Machlup
(1977) and other public sources.
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for, i.e. the effect of entering or leaving a RTA. In this specification, the coefficients
on the membership dummies can be interpreted as the average treatment effect of
entering in each kind of RTAs. For instance, the formation of the European
Communities by the initial six members is not captured by the coefficient on the CU
dummy since it occurred before the beginning of our time period, but the accession
of new members and the exit of all members from the CU agreement to create a CM
from 1992 on are. Thus, for the country pairs member of a preexisting CU, the
coefficient on the CM dummy captures the effect of entering a CM, while not being
member of a CU agreement anymore (the CU dummy is set at 0 for EU countries
from 1992 on).
4 Results
Results are reported in Table 1. The first two columns present estimates of the
traditional gravity equation, when only time fixed effects (column 1) or country-
and-time fixed effects (column 2) are included. Remaining columns report estimates
using the proper specifications of the gravity equation controlling for endogeneity.
Coefficients on control variables are found significant and all have the expected
sign—geographical distance impedes bilateral trade, as well as the fact to be
landlocked, whereas sharing a common border, language or colonial history
increases trade.9
Concerning our variables of interest, results are surprisingly diverging and large
when controlling only for time fixed effects. The trade creating effect of regional
integration range from a e0:09  1 ¼ 9% increase for PAs to a 232% for PoAs and a
282% for CUs. When country-and-time fixed effects are included (column 2),
coefficients on RTAs largely decrease, and the coefficient on CM becomes
insignificant. In this specification, political agreements exhibit the largest coeffi-
cient, corresponding to a 101% increase in bilateral trade. The ranking as well as the
size of coefficients cast doubts on the validity of these results.
First-differencing the data or introducing bilateral fixed effects to account for
self-selection into RTAs reduces the coefficients on PoAs and shallow RTAs but
increases the coefficient on CMs, which turns significant. Hence, the endogeneity
bias arising from unobserved variables affecting bilateral trade flows and RTA
membership differs according to the kind of RTA considered. It suggests that
different kinds of country pairs choose to form different kinds of RTAs, and that the
unobservable factors affecting the likelihood of RTA formation also affect trade, but
unevenly according to the depth of integration.
Results do show a robust significant average treatment effect of all kinds of RTAs
on bilateral trade, except that of political agreements in the first-differenced
specification. In the preferred specification (column 4), a CM is associated with a
current increase of 30% in bilateral trade, to be compared to 34% for a CU or a free
trade area, and 18% for a PA. When RTAs are considered jointly (column 5),
9 Results remain qualitatively similar when the coefficient on GDPs is constrained to 1, i.e. when the
dependent variable is replaced by ln Tijt ¼ ln impijtGDPitGDPjt þ ln
impjit
GDPitGDPjt
 
=2.
174 V. Vicard
123
T
ab
le
1
G
ra
v
it
y
es
ti
m
at
es
w
it
h
p
an
el
d
at
a
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
ln
T
ij
t
¼
ln
im
p
ij
t
þ
ln
im
p
ji
t

 =
2
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
ar
ra
n
g
em
en
t
1
.2
0
*
*
*
(0
.1
0
)
0
.7
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
9
)
0
.1
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
)
-
0
.0
8
(0
.0
7
)
P
re
fe
re
n
ti
al
ar
ra
n
g
em
en
t
0
.0
9
*
(0
.0
5
)
0
.3
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
)
0
.2
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
)
0
.1
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
)
F
re
e
tr
ad
e
ar
ea
0
.8
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
)
0
.5
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
)
0
.4
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
)
0
.2
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
)
C
u
st
o
m
u
n
io
n
1
.3
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
9
)
0
.6
4
*
*
*
(0
.1
1
)
0
.2
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
)
0
.2
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
)
C
o
m
m
o
n
m
ar
k
et
0
.8
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
)
-
0
.1
4
(0
.1
3
)
0
.4
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
)
0
.2
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
)
R
eg
io
n
al
tr
ad
e
ag
re
em
en
t
0
.2
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
)
L
o
g
(G
D
P
i*
G
D
P
j)
0
.8
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
)
N
o
.
o
f
la
n
d
lo
ck
ed
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
-
0
.2
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
)
L
o
g
d
is
ta
n
ce
-
0
.8
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
)
-
0
.9
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
)
C
o
n
ti
g
u
it
y
0
.3
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
)
0
.5
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
9
)
C
o
m
m
o
n
la
n
g
u
ag
e
0
.3
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
)
0
.3
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
)
C
o
lo
n
ia
l
li
n
k
1
.2
2
*
*
*
(0
.1
0
)
1
.2
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
9
)
C
o
m
m
o
n
co
lo
n
iz
er
0
.6
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
)
0
.7
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
)
C
o
n
st
an
t
-
6
.4
8
*
*
*
(0
.1
9
)
1
4
.4
*
*
*
(0
.3
0
)
0
.1
2
(0
.0
9
)
0
.5
5
(0
.7
1
)
0
.5
5
(0
.7
1
)
O
v
er
al
l
R
2
0
.7
2
0
.8
2
–
0
.3
5
0
.3
5
W
it
h
in
R
2
–
–
0
.7
0
–
–
N
o
.
o
f
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
3
3
,6
8
4
3
4
,5
1
4
3
5
,6
9
8
2
5
,1
6
9
2
5
,1
6
9
T
im
e
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
Y
es
–
–
–
–
C
o
u
n
tr
y
-a
n
d
-t
im
e
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
–
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
o
u
n
tr
y
-p
ai
r
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
–
–
Y
es
–
–
F
ir
st
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
–
–
–
Y
es
Y
es
H
et
er
o
sc
ed
as
ti
ci
ty
-
an
d
au
to
co
rr
el
at
io
n
-r
o
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
fo
r
ti
m
e,
co
u
n
tr
y
-a
n
d
-t
im
e
an
d
co
u
n
tr
y
-p
ai
r
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
ar
e
n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
ed
*
,*
*
,
*
*
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1
0
,
5
an
d
1
%
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
Regional trade agreements 175
123
regional integration is found to increase intra-zone trade by 26%. These results are
in line with the 36% contemporaneous effect found by Baier and Bergstrand (2007),
on a different sample of countries and a restricted sample of RTAs excluding PAs.
A third important result is that the average treatment effects of all kinds of RTAs
providing trade preferences to their members are statistically similar. Indeed, the
hypothesis of equality of coefficients on the different kinds of RTAs (PoAs
excluded) cannot be rejected, jointly and separately, at traditional level of
significance in first-differenced specification, and the equality of coefficients on
FTA and CM cannot be rejected in the fixed effect specification (see Table 2). If
any, only PAs could be understood as a first step of integration providing for less
trade integration than other more ‘‘integrated’’ agreements. This suggests that the
institutional design of regional agreements does not determine their ability to create
trade among members. The effect on trade of forming an FTA, a CU or a CM is not
statistically different, but different country pairs form different RTAs.
This rather counterintuitive result is not so surprising in the light of the lack of
theory actually predicting that an FTA would systematically reduce more
transactions costs on intra-regional trade than a CU. It suggests that the choice of
countries to create different forms of RTAs is not only related to trade issues.
Notwithstanding, the fact that if similar country pairs were to enter a CU, an FTA or
a CM, the effect on bilateral trade would be similar does not preclude any trade
related determinants of the choice of RTAs. The fact that unobserved heterogeneity
affects differently country pairs entering different kinds of RTAs suggests that gains
from regional integration could differ according to characteristics of both member
countries and specific trade agreements. These results could have interesting
implications to explain the diverging effects of RTAs found in the literature (Ghosh
and Yamarik 2004a). Overall, empirical evidence provided in this paper points out
Table 2 Wald tests of equality of coefficients on PA, FTA, CU and CM
Specification All coeff. PA-FTA FTA-CU FTA-CM CU-CM
Basic specification
Fixed effect 4.77*** 8.75*** 4.10** 0.62 8.27***
First difference 1.09 2.61 0.00 0.15 0.25
With lags (total ATE)
Fixed effect 3.57** 9.82*** 2.06 0.05 1.63
First difference 2.75** 5.56** 0.34 2.98* 1.66
Without bilateral RTAs
Fixed effect 2.31* 2.55 1.69 0.30 5.33**
First difference 0.72 1.32 0.00 0.20 0.39
1990–2000
Fixed effect 0.90 0.72 2.46 1.78 0.17
First difference 1.62 3.09* 0.16 0.01 0.41
*, **, *** Null hypothesis of equality of coefficients can be rejected at the 10, 5 and 1% level,
respectively
176 V. Vicard
123
that creating a free trade area, a CU or a CM has a similar effect on bilateral trade,
but that different country pairs tend to create different kind of RTAs.
5 Robustness analysis
In this section, I test for the sensitivity of the above results to several sources of bias
and perturbations, namely lagged effects, alternative sample of years and countries
and definition of RTAs, and time-varying missing variables.
5.1 Lagged effects
Regional trade agreements generally plan a phase-in period during which provisions
of the treaty are implemented gradually. They are thus likely to have lagged effects
on trade, as all provisions of the agreement are generally implemented over a 5- to
10-year period of time. For instance, the treaty of Rome creating the European
Economic Community in 1958 projected the full implementation of the CU in 1968.
The date of entry into force of a RTA does not correspond to its full implementation,
so that our membership dummy variable, which is coded 1 from the date of entry
into force of the agreement, cannot account for this phase-in period. One-period-
lagged variables of each of the dummies measuring RTA membership are thus
added to our specification. Since some kinds of RTAs, notably CMs, have largely
been created in the 1990s, we cannot account for further lags because the time span
of our data set is not large enough.
Results, presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, clearly confirm previous
findings. All categories of RTAs, except political agreements in the first-differenced
specification, significantly increase bilateral trade from their date of entry into force.
Moreover, FTAs and CUs in the fixed-effect specification exhibit an additional
effect after 5 years. The total average treatment effect after 5 years is 68 and 51% in
the fixed-effect and first-differenced specifications, respectively, for FTAs, and 48
and 46% for CUs. The coefficient on the lagged term of CM membership is however
not statistically significant. The fact that CMs have been preceded by CUs or
bilateral FTAs is likely to explain the lack of significance of the lagged variable.
The contemporary average treatment effect of a CM is nevertheless slightly larger
that in our basic specification, namely 72 and 34% in the fixed-effect and first-
differenced specifications, respectively. Again, the hypothesis of equality of
coefficients on FTA, CU and CM cannot be rejected at traditional level of
significance (see Table 2).
5.2 Samples of RTAs and years
Another source of heterogeneity is related to the definition of RTAs. Indeed,
bilateral agreements are likely to differ substantially from regional agreements
(including three or more partners) in terms of determinants as well as the
institutional framework they provide. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 test for the
robustness of the results of the previous section to the exclusion of bilateral RTAs in
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our explaining variables. Results remain qualitatively similar: all kinds of RTAs are
found to increase intra-zone trade, but this trade creating effect does not statistically
differ according to the depth of integration.
Another source of heterogeneity within each category of RTAs may be related to
country members. The specificities of the RTAs, and their effect on intra-regional
trade, could indeed differ according to the level of wealth of member countries for
each kind of agreement. In order to test the sensitivity of my results to this kind of
heterogeneity, I include interaction terms between RTA membership dummies and a
dummy equal to one when both countries are members of the OECD, as a proxy for
pairs of rich countries. Since CMs have been created only among OECD members
and preferential agreements are entitled only among developing countries, I add
interactions with the FTA and CU dummies to the basic specification. Results are
presented in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3. Interactions variables are not
significant in the first-differenced specification, but are in the fixed-effect
specification. The latter suggests that FTAs are less trade creating and that CUs
are more trade creating among OECD countries; the coefficients on FTA among
non-OECD members, CU among OECD members and CM are nevertheless not
statistically different in the fixed-effect specification. In the specification in first-
difference, the results remain qualitatively similar.
In addition, both the explosion of the number and coverage of RTAs (see Fig. 1)
and the increased depth of agreements such as the EU since the 1990s have led some
scholars to qualify this wave of regionalism as new regionalism. In this respect, it
could be argued that determinants and characteristics of new RTAs signed in the
1990s could differ from previous agreements. In order to test for any specificity of
this period, Eq. 1 is estimated on a sample restricted to the 1990s. Results are
presented in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3. The average treatment effect of each
kind of RTAs is similar when estimated only over the 1990s and on the whole year
sample. Results diverge only concerning PAs, for which the coefficient is slightly
larger in the fixed-effect specification and insignificant in the differenced
specification. Anyway, Wald tests of equality of coefficients on all categories of
RTAs providing for trade preferences are not rejected in both specifications (see
Table 2), confirming that the treatment effect of RTAs on bilateral trade does not
differ according to their form.
5.3 Time-varying country pair–specific determinants of trade
Country-and-time dummies included in all our specifications control for all country
characteristics likely to affect trade, time-invariant (landlocked countries, area,
island,…) as well as time-varying determinants (GDP, GDP per capita, economic
governance, transport infrastructure, specialization, external tariffs as well as any
determinant related to preferential market access such as the number of RTAs in
which countries take part). Moreover, country-pair fixed effects (or first-differenc-
ing the data) account for dyadic determinants of trade (distance, contiguity, cultural
proximity, common language…) and country-pair heterogeneity that are constant
over time. Still, an endogeneity bias could arise because of omitted variables
varying over time and affecting both the likelihood to enter one category of RTAs
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and bilateral trade flows. In this section, I control for two such potential endogeneity
issues: interstate political affinities and variations in bilateral real exchange rates.
Trade policy is considered by many countries as an instrument of foreign policy.
For instance, Lederman and Ozden (2007) argue that the United States grant trade
preferences, notably by signing bilateral FTAs, largely on a geopolitical basis.
Maintaining good diplomatic relations is therefore likely to facilitate the negotiation
and signing of an RTA. Besides, having good interstate political relations reduces
the risk related to international trade and thus foster trade flows. Two variables are
used as proxy for interstate affinity: the vote correlation in the United Nations
General Assembly, taken from The Affinity of Nations: Similarity of State Voting
Positions in the UN General Assembly developed by Erik Gartzke,10 and the number
of peaceful years between two countries, computed from the Correlates of War
Project.11 Results presented in Table 4 are mixed: UN vote correlation exerts a
positive and significant effect on bilateral trade only in the fixed-effect specification,
whereas having peaceful relations has no significant effect on bilateral trade flows.
Nevertheless, controlling for political affinity does not alter our results on the
equality of coefficients. Coefficients on CU and CM are slightly larger and the
10 http://dss.ucsd.edu/*egartzke/.
11 http://cow2.la.psu.edu/.
Table 4 Robustness analysis: time-varying country pair–specific variables
Dependent variable ln Tijt ¼ ln impijt þ ln impjit
 
=2
Interstate political affinity Exchange rate volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political arrangement 0.19** (0.09) -0.03 (0.08) 0.18** (0.09) -0.05 (0.08)
Preferential arrangement 0.21***(0.06) 0.25*** (0.06) 0.22*** (0.07) 0.11 (0.08)
Free trade area 0.31*** (0.08) 0.27*** (0.07) 0.29***(0.06) 0.20***(0.05)
Custom union 0.31*** (0.07) 0.29*** (0.08) 0.27*** (0.07) 0.31*** (0.07)
Common market 0.52*** (0.09) 0.26*** (0.09) 0.63*** (0.08) 0.19*** (0.08)
UN vote correlation 0.27*** (0.06) 0.06 (0.05)
No. of peaceful years -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Exchange rate volatility -0.04 (0.04) -0.02 (0.06)
Constant 0.23*** (0.09) -0.77** (0.31) 0.82*** (0.05) 0.82 (3.21)
Overall R2 – 0.38 – 0.36
Within R2 0.72 – 0.76 –
No. of observations 25687 17297 21891 15187
Country-and-time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair fixed effects Yes – Yes –
First difference – Yes – Yes
Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for country-
and-time and country-pair fixed effects are not reported
*, **, *** Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively
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coefficient on FTA is lower in the fixed-effects specification, but only the coefficient
on PA is affected in the differenced specification.
The volatility of nominal exchange rates create risks on international transaction
and uncertainty at the firm level; it is thus likely that economic agents would be
discouraged from trading with countries exhibiting a large exchange rate volatility
with their home country. By reducing risks related to exchange rate variations, fixed
exchange rate systems would then increase the volume of bilateral trade. At the
same time, common currencies or monetary systems limiting currency fluctuations
are mostly established on a regional basis. The volatility of exchange rates could
thus be correlated to trade flows and the decision to create a RTA. To control for this
potential omitted variable bias, I include a variable of exchange rate variability
between countries i and j in year t, denoted volijt in (1). Following Tenreyro (2007),
the exchange rate variability is measured as the standard deviation of the first
difference of (the logarithm of) the monthly exchange rate between the two
countries:
volijt ¼ SD ln eijt;m
  ln e ijt;m1
  
; m ¼ 1; . . .; 12 ð2Þ
where eijt,m is the monthly bilateral nominal exchange rate.
Data come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Reuters,
provided by EcoWin Financial. The availability of data on monthly nominal
exchange rates noticeably reduces the sample. Results are presented in columns (3)
and (4) of Table 4. The coefficient on exchange rate volatility is negative but not
significant in both specifications, which is in line with the ambiguous effect put
forward in the literature (Tenreyro 2007). Turning to our variables of interest,
results remain consistent with the benchmark estimates. It is worth noting that the
fact that the coefficients on PA, FTA and CM are found slightly lower in the first-
differenced specification, and the CM coefficient slightly larger in the fixed-effect
specification, is related to the restricted sample rather than the inclusion of the
variable of exchange rate volatility.12 Again, the results on the equality of
coefficients basically hold when controlling for the volatility of bilateral exchange
rates.
The results presented in this paper are therefore robust to a number of robustness
checks regarding lagged effects, the definition of RTAs, the period and countries
considered, and the inclusion of time varying determinants of trade and RTA
formation.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigated whether the form of RTAs matters concerning their effect
on trade, in a gravity type framework differentiating four categories of RTAs
according to the usual taxonomy initiated by Balassa (1961): PAs, FTAs, CUs and
CMs. It shows a significant and positive average treatment effect of all kinds of
RTAs providing trade preferences to their members on bilateral trade. However,
12 Estimating the baseline model on this restricted sample yields the same results.
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once self-selection into agreements is controlled for, their trade creation effect does
not statistically differ according to the depth of the RTA: creating a FTA, a CU or a
CM has a similar impact on trade among members. Different pairs of countries thus
create different kinds of RTAs.
The latter result emphasizes that the different forms of regional integration do not
reflect any larger potential trade creation effect. It suggests that the depth of RTAs
should not only be defined on the criteria of their ability to foster trade. Instead, it
should also be regarded as a question of political or institutional integration.
In addition, these results support a ‘‘market for regionalism’’ view of RTAs,
where different country pairs choose to create different kinds of RTAs. Further work
is nevertheless necessary to understand what drives gains from preferential trade
integration and to highlight the determinants of successful integration processes
according to both RTAs’ and member countries’ characteristics.
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Appendix: Regional trade agreements (1960–2000)
Name Official dates Actual dates
(5-year intervals)
Common markets
Benelux 1961 (1965–2000)
European Union (EU) 1992 (1995–2000)
Customs unions
Eurasian Economic Community 1997 (2000–2000)
Equatorial Customs Union 1959–1965 (1960–1965)
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 1994 (1995–2000)
Mano River Union 1973 (1975–2000)
Customs Union of West African States 1960–1966 (1960–1965)
West African Economic and Monetary Union 1998 (2000–2000)
East African Community 1967–1977 (1970–1975)
Benelux 1947–1960 (1960–1960)
European Communities (EC) 1958–1991 (1960–1990)
Customs Union EU-Malta 1971 (1975–2000)
Customs Union EU-Cyprus 1973 (1975–2000)
Customs Union EU-Turkey 1996 (2000–2000)
Customs Union Czech Republic-Slovakia 1993 (1995–2000)
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 1991 (1995–2000)
Central American Common Market (CACM) 1993 (1995–2000)
Andean Customs Uniona 1995 (1995–2000)
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) 1973 (1975–2000)
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Appendix continued
Name Official dates Actual dates
(5-year intervals)
Free trade agreements
Closer Trade Relations Trade Agreement 1983 (1985–2000)
Commonwealth of Independent States 1995 (1995–2000)
Papua New Guinea and Australia Trade and Commercial
Relation Agreement
1977 (1980–2000)
Baltic Free Trade Area 1994 (1995–2000)
Central European Free Trade Agreement 1993 (1995–2000)
European Economic Area 1994 (1995–2000)
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) 1960 (1960–2000)
Group of Three 1995 (1995–2000)
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1994 (1995–2000)
South African Development Community 2000 (2000–2000)
Central American Common Market 1961–1975 (1965–1975)
Andean Free Trade Areaa 1993 (2000–2000)a
Caribbean Free Trade Area 1968–1972 (1970–1970)
Armenia-Moldova 1995 (1995–2000)
Armenia-Russia 1993 (1995–2000)
Armenia-Turkmenistan 1996 (2000–2000)
Armenia-Ukraine 1996 (2000–2000)
Bulgaria-Turkey 1999 (2000–2000)
Canada-Chile 1997 (2000–2000)
Canada-Israel 1997 (2000–2000)
CARICOM-Dominican Republic 1998 (2000–2000)
Czech Republic-Estonia 1998 (2000–2000)
Czech Republic-Israel 1997 (2000–2000)
Czech Republic-Latvia 1997 (2000–2000)
Czech Republic-Lithuania 1997 (2000–2000)
Czech Republic-Turkey 1998 (2000–2000)
EU-Algeria 1998 (2000–2000)
EU-Bulgaria 1994 (1995–2000)
EU-Czech Republic 1992 (1995–2000)
EU-Egypt 1977 (1995–2000)
EU-Estonia 1995 (1995–2000)
EU-Hungary 1992 (1995–2000)
EU-Israel 2000 (2000–2000)
EU-Latvia 1995 (1995–2000)
EU-Lithuania 1995 (1995–2000)
EU-Morocco 2000 (2000–2000)
EU-Norway 1973–1993 (1975–1990)
EU-Poland 1992 (1995–2000)
EU-Romania 1993 (1995–2000)
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Appendix continued
Name Official dates Actual dates
(5-year intervals)
EU-Slovakia 1992 (1995–2000)
EU-Slovenia 1997 (2000–2000)
EU-South Africa 2000 (2000–2000)
EU-Switzerland 1973 (1975–2000)
EU-Syria 1977 (1980–2000)
EU-Tunisia 1998 (2000–2000)
EFTA-Bulgaria 1993 (1995–2000)
EFTA-Czech Republic 1992 (1995–2000)
EFTA-Estonia 1996 (2000–2000)
EFTA-Hungary 1993 (1995–2000)
EFTA-Israel 1993 (1995–2000)
EFTA-Latvia 1996 (2000–2000)
EFTA-Lithuania 1996 (2000–2000)
EFTA-Morocco 1999 (2000–2000)
EFTA-Poland 1993 (1995–2000)
EFTA-Romania 1993 (1995–2000)
EFTA-Slovakia 1992 (1995–2000)
EFTA-Slovenia 1995 (1995–2000)
EFTA-Turkey 1992 (1995–2000)
Estonia-Turkey 1998 (2000–2000)
Estonia-Ukraine 1996 (2000–2000)
Georgia-Armenia 1998 (2000–2000)
Georgia-Azerbaijan 1996 (2000–2000)
Georgia-Kazakhstan 1999 (2000–2000)
Georgia-Russia 1994 (1995–2000)
Georgia-Turkmenistan 2000 (2000–2000)
Georgia-Ukraine 1996 (2000–2000)
Hungary-Israel 1998 (2000–2000)
Hungary-Latvia 2000 (2000–2000)
Hungary-Lithuania 2000 (2000–2000)
Hungary-Turkey 1998 (2000–2000)
Kyrgyzstan-Armenia 1995 (1995–2000)
Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan 1995 (1995–2000)
Kyrgyzstan-Moldova 1996 (2000–2000)
Kyrgyzstan-Russia 1993 (1995–2000)
Kyrgyzstan-Ukraine 1998 (2000–2000)
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan 1998 (2000–2000)
Latvia-Turkey 2000 (2000–2000)
Lithuania-Turkey 1998 (2000–2000)
MERCOSUR-Chile 1996 (2000–2000)
MERCOSUR-Bolivia 1996 (2000–2000)
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Appendix continued
Name Official dates Actual dates
(5-year intervals)
Mexico-Israel 2000 (2000–2000)
Mexico-Costa Rica 1995 (1995–2000)
Mexico-Bolivia 1995 (1995–2000)
Mexico-Nicaragua 1998 (2000–2000)
Poland-Israel 1998 (2000–2000)
Poland-Latvia 1999 (2000–2000)
Poland-Lithuania 1997 (2000–2000)
Poland-Turkey 2000 (2000–2000)
Romania-Turkey 1998 (2000–2000)
Slovakia-Estonia 1998 (2000–2000)
Slovakia-Israel 1997 (2000–2000)
Slovakia-Latvia 1997 (2000–2000)
Slovakia-Lithuania 1997 (2000–2000)
Slovakia-Turkey 1998 (2000–2000)
Slovenia-Estonia 1997 (2000–2000)
Slovenia-Israel 1998 (2000–2000)
Slovenia-Latvia 1996 (2000–2000)
Slovenia-Lithuania 1997 (2000–2000)
United States of America-Israel 1985 (1985–2000)
United States of America-Canada 1989–1993 (1990–1990)
India-Bhutan 1995 (1995–2000)
India-Nepal 1996 (2000–2000)
India-Sri Lanka 1998 (2000–2000)
Preferential arrangements
Protocol Relating to Trade Negotiations among
Developing Countries (PTN)
1973 (1975–2000)
Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing
Countries (GSTP)
1989 (1990–2000)
Tripartite agreement 1968 (1970–2000)
Economic Cooperation Organization 1992 (1995–2000)
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 1984 (1985–2000)
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation
Agreement
1981 (1985–2000)
Melanesian Spearhead Group 1993 (1995–2000)
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 1949–1990 (1960–1990)
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 1992 (1995–2000)
Bangkok Agreement 1976 (1980–2000)
South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement 1995 (1995–2000)
West African Economic Community 1973–1997 (1975–1995)
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 1994 (1995–2000)
East African Cooperation 2000 (2000–2000)
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Appendix continued
Name Official dates Actual dates
(5-year intervals)
Latin American Free Trade Association 1961–1980 (1965–1980)
Latin American Integration Association 1993 (1995–2000)
Andean Communitya 1988–1997 (1990–1995)a
CARICOM-Colombia 1995 (1995–2000)
CARICOM-Venezuela 1993 (1995–2000)
Laos-Thailand 1991 (1995–2000)
Chile-Peru 1998 (2000–2000)
Chile-Bolivia 1993 (1995–2000)
Chile-Colombia 1994 (1995–2000)
Chile-Venezuela 1993 (1995–2000)
Political agreements
Regional Cooperation for Development 1965–1979 (1965–1975)
Arab Maghreb Union 1989 (1990–2000)
South African Development Coordination Conference
(SADC)
1980–1999 (1980–1995)
Cross Border Initiative 1990 (1990–2000)
Association of South East Asian Nations 1967 (1970–2000)
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 1985 (1985–2000)
Asian Pacific Cooperation 1989 (1990–2000)
Source: WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm), Foroutan (1993, 1998),
Langhammer and Hiemenz (1990), Frankel (1997), Machlup (1977) and other public sources
a Peru entered the Andean Free Trade Area only in 1997, and did not join the Andean Customs Union
until 2004
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